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The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content †
By Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya *
We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the 
least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that 
the empirical content of a theory is captured by a certain kind 
of axiomatization, with axioms that are universal negations of 
conjunctions of atomic formulae. (JEL B41, D01, D11)
The purpose of this study is to understand the notions of falsifiability and empiri-
cal content, independently of their specific meaning in particular economic  theories. 
We introduce a framework for studying the empirical content of an economic  theory. 
Our main result is a description of the types of axioms that characterize empirical 
content.
We define theories as hypothetical “extensions’’ of data sets. For example, if one 
can observe revealed preference demand data, then a theory consists of a class of 
preferences whose consistency with the data is to be tested. If there is a preference 
in the theory that could rationalize the data, then the data would be called rationaliz-
able; otherwise, the data falsify the theory.
Some theories make nontestable claims, in that there are less restrictive, obser-
vationally equivalent theories. The theory of utility maximization is an example. It 
is observationally equivalent to the theory of weak order (complete and transitive 
preference) maximization, because every finite data set rationalizable by a weak 
order is also rationalizable by a utility function. We define the empirical content of 
a theory T as the weakest theory observationally equivalent to T.
The goal of this article is to establish that the falsifiability of a theory is related 
to the form (or syntax) of the axioms that characterize the theory. Our result ties 
empirical content to a certain kind of axiom, called “UNCAF.’’ An UNCAF axiom 
precludes certain simultaneous observations.
Two familiar examples of axioms are the weak axiom of revealed preference and 
the completeness axiom (stating that any two alternatives must be comparable). 
The weak axiom is UNCAF: for any pair x and y, it precludes the simultaneous 
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 observation of x being revealed weakly preferred to y and y being revealed strictly 
preferred to x.
Therefore, it expresses a falsifiable property. The completeness axiom is not 
UNCAF, and not falsifiable.
In Section I, we present our framework for the well-known case of revealed pref-
erence theory: the empirical content of the theories of utility maximization and weak 
order maximization are captured by the strong axiom of revealed preference, which 
is UNCAF. The remainder of the article contains a rigorous exposition of our results, 
together with some examples that are more involved than the basic examples in 
Section I. The mathematics used are simple but unfamiliar to many economists. The 
ideas are borrowed from mathematical logic and model theory, which are areas of 
mathematics studying the relationship between the structure of mathematical state-
ments and the mathematical objects to which they apply.
I. Illustration of Empirical Content
Two economists, Woland and Ulysses, present their theories about data on agents’ 
choices. Woland’s theory, denoted  T wo , is the theory of weak order maximization. 
According to  T wo , agents have some complete and transitive preference relation over 
alternatives. Woland claims that weak and strong revealed preferences are instances 
of some theoretical weak order preference relation. Ulysses’s theory, denoted 
 T u , is the theory of utility maximization. According to  T u , agents have some utility 
function over alternatives, and revealed preferences are compatible with this utility 
function.
Both Ulysses and Woland agree on which situations represent “weak revealed pref-
erence” and “strict revealed preference.” For example, they both agree that an indi-
vidual reveals a weak preference for alternative x to alternative y when the individual 
is willing to choose x over y in direct comparison, and that the individual reveals a 
strict preference for x over y when the individual is willing to choose x over y and 
some amount of money. Thus, both economists translate behavior to revealed prefer-
ence in the same way. However, they present different theories about preferences.
Ulysses makes a stronger claim than Woland, because any utility function rep-
resents a weak order, while there are weak orders that have no representation by a 
utility function. A well-known example is the lexicographic order on  ℜ 2 , which is 
a weak order without a utility representation. So, it may seem as though Ulysses 
takes more risks than Woland, since if one could demonstrate that an individual 
has lexicographic preferences, Ulysses’s theory would be falsified while Woland’s 
would not. It is easy to see, however, that this can never be demonstrated. Data sets 
are finite, so even if a lexicographic order governs an individual’s choices, any data 
set taken from her observed behavior can be rationalized by a utility function.
So some claims made by Ulysses are not falsifiable. Is Woland guilty of the same 
delinquency? The answer is yes. For example, Woland’s claim that the agent’s 
weak preference relation is complete is not falsifiable. Under Woland’s theory, 
Mark Twain must either weakly prefer coffee to tea or strictly prefer tea to coffee. 
All the same, even if Twain holds neither preference, no data can reveal this fact. 
Woland can always claim that nonobservation of these choices does not imply their 
nonexistence.
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The nonfalsifiability of Woland’s claims is a consequence of a phenomenon we 
call partial observability. Data sets can affirm the existence of the entities and rela-
tionships we observe but cannot imply that relationships we do not observe do not 
exist. Partial observability reflects a fundamental feature of scientific data. In the 
words of Carl Sagan, “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.’’ We shall 
see that partial observability has important consequences for the form of the axioms 
that capture empirical content.
Of course,  T wo and  T u also make falsifiable claims. If Merlin is observed to strictly 
prefer Sangrail to Excalibur, strictly prefer Excalibur to Ring of Dispel and strictly 
prefer Ring of Dispel to Sangrail, then both  T wo and  T u are proven false.
To sum up,  T wo and  T u make some falsifiable and some nonfalsifiable claims. 
There is a well-known way to separate the wheat from the chaff. Denote weak and 
strict preference by ⪰ and ≻. The (common) falsifiable implications of  T wo and  T u 
are captured by the strong axiom of revealed preference: for all n ≥ 1,
(1) ∀ x 1 … ∀ x n ¬  (  ∧ 
i=1
n
 ( x i  R i  x i+1 ) ∧ ( x n ≻  x i ) ) ,
where for all i,  R i is either ≻ or ⪰. Note that the “strong axiom of revealed 
preference’’ is actually a collection of axioms. These axioms include ∀ x 1  ∀ x 2 ¬  ( ( x 1 ⪰  x 2 ) ∧ ( x 2 ≻  x 1 ) ) (the weak axiom of revealed preference) and ∀ x 1 ∀ x 2  ∀ x 3 ¬  ( ( x 1 ⪰  x 2 ) ∧ ( x 2 ⪰  x 3 ) ∧ ( x 3 ≻  x 1 ) ) (ruling out cycles of length 3).
After purging all nonfalsifiable assertions made by Ulysses and Woland, their 
theories claim that agents’ behavior does not exhibit cycles, as described by 
Axiom (1).
The structure of Axiom (1) is responsible for its falsifiability. It starts with univer-
sal (∀) quantification, then negation (¬), and then a conjunction (∧) of statements 
of the form “y ⪰ z” or “z ≻ x”. The latter statements are called atomic formulae 
in mathematics. In our framework, they are statements about the observations that 
compose a data set. Thus, axioms like (1) are falsifiable because they are universal 
statements that negate a conjunction of basic statements about observables: “univer-
sal negation of conjunctions of atomic formulae’’ (UNCAF).
The main result of the article is that the empirical content of a theory is axioma-
tized by the UNCAF axioms that are true in the theory. A theory with an UNCAF 
axiomatization makes only falsifiable claims.
Much of modern decision theory is motivated by the idea that axioms provide 
the testable implications of a theory. Our main result provides a guide as to which 
kinds of axioms serve the stated purpose of decision theorists. Not all axioms used 
in economics or decision theory are UNCAF. For example, the completeness axiom 
∀x ∀y(x ⪰ y) ∨ (y ⪰ x) and the nonsatiation axiom ∀x ∃y (y ≻ x) are not UNCAF. 
We present additional examples in Section IIIA.
II. A Formal Model for Empirical Content
In Section I we discussed empirical content in the context of classical revealed 
preference. It was enough then to consider weak and strong revealed preference, and 
our axioms used only the symbols ⪰ and ≻. But now these symbols may no longer be 
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enough. In order to accommodate other theories and frameworks, we need to allow 
for other symbols. For example, to discuss some modern models in decision theory, 
we need to introduce the union and intersection of sets (for example, to accommo-
date the models of Kreps 1979 and Gul and Pesendorfer 2001; see Section IIIA). 
Yet other models may need symbols to signify that an object is a strategy, or that an 
element is chosen from a set of available actions.
We collect the symbols that we need into a language. A language comprises sym-
bols for the relations that can potentially be observed and that one can talk about in 
axioms. After formally introducing languages, we proceed to define data and theo-
ries, and the empirical content of a theory.
A language  is given by a finite set of relation symbols and, for each relation 
symbol R, a positive integer  n R , the arity of R.
For the revealed preference example discussed in Section I, the language is 
 RP = 〈⪰, ≻〉. It has two binary relation symbols (i.e., relation symbols of arity 2 ): ⪰, which is intended to express revealed weak preference, and ≻, which is intended 
to express revealed strict preference.
Let  be a language. An -data set  is given by:
 (i) A finite nonempty set D (the domain of ).
 (ii) An n-ary relation  R  over D for every n-ary relation symbol R of .1
For each R, one should think of an element ( x 1 , … ,  x  n R  ) ∈  R  as an observation. 
We have observed that the elements  x 1 , … ,  x  n R  of D stand in relation  R  . A data set 
collects a finite number of observations.
Consider the language   RP discussed in Section I. An example of an   RP -data set 
is
 D = {Sangrail, Excalibur, Ring of Dispel},
with
 Sangrail ≻  Excalibur,
 Excalibur ≻  Ring of Dispel,
 Ring of Dispel ≻  Sangrail.
Less colorful examples abound in empirical studies of consumption.
We now turn to the definition of theory. The main building block is the concept of 
structure. An -structure  is given by the following:
 (i) A nonempty set M (the domain of ).
 (ii) An n-ary relation  R  over M for every n-ary relation symbol R of .
1 An n-ary relation on D is a subset of  D  n . By convention, we write  R D ( x 1 , …,   x n ) if ( x 1 , …,   x n ) ∈  R D , and if 
 R D is a binary relation, we use the more familiar x  R D y instead of  R  D (x, y).
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A structure is a hypothetical construct used to extend, or rationalize, data. A struc-
ture describes objects and relations that were not necessarily observed, but that 
might have been observed. In contrast, a data set describes actual observations.
DEFINITION 1: An -structure  rationalizes an -data set  if the following 
conditions are satisfied:
 (i) D ⊆ M, where D and M are the domains of  and .
 (ii)  R  ⊆  R   .
In the context of our recurring example of revealed preference theory, to rational-
ize data is to “complete’’ the relations by adding all unobserved relations to render 
the agents’ full preference relation consistent with a given theory.
In Definition 1, note that we require  R  ⊆  R  and not that  R  is the restriction 
of  R   to D. This requirement reflects our assumptions that relations are only par-
tially observed in the data set. For example, a data set D = {coffee, tea} in which 
we observe only the weak preference tea  ⪰ D coffee is rationalized by a structure in 
which tea is both weakly and strictly preferred to coffee. This is the nature of partial 
observability.
We now turn to the definition of theory. We define a theory as a collection of 
isomorphic structures in some language. Two structures are isomorphic if we can 
identify the objects across the two structures so that all relations are preserved: let 
 and   be -structures with domains M and N, respectively. Formally, an iso-
morphism from  to  is a bijective map η : M → N that preserves the interpreta-
tions of all symbols of : ( a 1 , … ,  a  n R  ) ∈  R   if and only if (η( a 1 ), … , η( a  n R  )) ∈  R   
for every relation symbol R of L and  a 1 , … ,  a  n R  ∈ M.
DEFINITION 2: An -theory T is a class of structures that is closed under isomor-
phism. A data set  is T-rationalizable if there is a structure in T that rationalizes 
. Otherwise,  falsifies T.
We note that the term “theory” is used in model theory for a different purpose than 
ours. For a similar use of the term in economics, see Schipper (2009).
Consider the example in Section I. Woland’s theory and Ulysses’s theory are both 
expressed in the same language   RP . As we emphasized in Section I, we assume 
that Woland and Ulysses interpret the symbols ⪰ and ≻ of the language in the 
same way. Woland’s theory  T wo consists of all structures  = (M,  ⪰  ,  ≻  ), 
where M is a set,  ⪰   is a weak order on M, and  ≻   is the strict preference asso-
ciated to  ⪰  . Ulysses’s theory  T u consists of all structures  = (M,  ⪰   , ≻   ), 
where M is a set, and there is a utility function u : M → ℜ, such that x  ⪰   y if 
and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) and x ≻  y if and only if u(x) > u(y). The data set 
D = {Sangrail, Excalibur, Ring of Dispel}, whereby Sangrail ≻  Excalibur, 
Excalibur ≻  Ring of Dispel, and Ring of Dispel ≻  Sangrail falsifies both  T wo 
and  T u , as it cannot be rationalized by any weak order or utility function.
We are now in a position to introduce the main new concept in the article, the 
concept of empirical content. Recall that Ulysses’s theory is strictly more restrictive 
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than Woland’s:  T u ⊊  T wo . The two theories are, however, observationally equivalent. 
Any data set that falsifies the weaker theory  T wo also falsifies  T u . According to the 
definition we propose below, these theories have the same empirical content.
The theory  T wo can also be weakened without changing its observable implica-
tions. Consider the structure (X,  ⪰ X , ≻ X ), in which X is a set of packages of salt. 
Suppose that  ⪰ X is the weak order in which x  ⪰ X y whenever x has more salt than 
y. Suppose, however, that x ≻ X y only when x has at least 50 grams more salt than 
y. The structure (X,  ⪰ X , ≻ X ) is not in  T wo , as  ≻ X is not the strict preference relation 
associated to  ⪰ X (such objects are studied by decision theorists in the literature on 
semiorders). However, the choices generated by an agent with preferences  ⪰ X and 
≻ X over X do not falsify  T wo .
For example, consider the data set with alternatives  {  x 350 ,  x 375 } , where  x k is a packet 
with k grams of salt. The observations consist of  x 375 ⪰ X  x 350 and  ≻ X = 0/, so there is 
no observed strict comparison. Such data are rationalizable by  T wo , because the data 
are silent on whether  x 375 is strictly preferred to  x 350 or  x 350 is weakly preferred to 
 x 375 . Note that partial observability plays a crucial role in this example.
The idea that a theory can be weakened without observable consequences moti-
vates the notion of empirical content. The empirical content of a theory is the most 
permissive observationally equivalent weakening of the theory. Formally:
DEFINITION 3: The empirical content of a theory T, denoted ec(T), is the class of 
all structures  that do not rationalize any data set that falsifies T.
III. Main Result
We proceed to define UNCAF axioms and state our main result.
Given a language , we can write formulae using the symbols in . In addition 
to the relation symbols specified by , we shall use certain logical symbols. These 
symbols are fixed, and we are allowed to use them regardless of the language under 
consideration. The logical symbols are the quantifiers “exists’’ (∃) and “for all’’ (∀); 
“not’’ (¬); the logical connectives “and’’ (∧) and “or’’ (∨); a countable set of vari-
able symbols x, y, z, u, v, w, … ; parentheses “(‘and’)”; and equality and inequality 
symbols “=” and “≠”. The use of an inequality symbol is not standard in math-
ematical logic (see Remark 1 for why we added it).
Certain strings of symbols can be put together to form axioms. We shall not spell 
out the formal rules for forming axioms because we mostly consider a special kind 
of axiom in this article, UNCAF axioms, defined below. Rules for forming axioms 
are in, for example, Marker (2002). Such rules are intuitive and immediately recog-
nizable: the string “∀x∃y x ≻ y” is a legitimate axiom. The string “∀y∃ ≻ x” is not.
UNCAF axioms are built out of simple blocks. The first notion is that of an atomic 
formula.
An atomic formula ϕ of a language  is either
 (i)  t 1 =  t 2 or  t 1 ≠  t 2 , where  t 1 ,  t 2 are variable symbols.
 (ii) R( t 1 , … ,  t  n R  ) where R is a relation symbol of  and  t 1 , … ,  t  n R  are variable 
symbols.
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In the language   RP of revealed preference, all atomic formulae use at most two 
variable symbols. The atomic formulae using one variable symbol, say x, are x ⪰ x, 
x ≻ x, x = x, and x ≠ x. The atomic formulae using two variable symbols, say x 
and y, are x ⪰ y, x ≻ y, x = y, and x ≠ y. Atomic formulae represent the types of 
observations that data sets contain.
DEFINITION 4: Let  be a language. A universal negation of a conjunction of 
atomic formulae (UNCAF) axiom is a string of the form
 ∀ v 1 ∀ v 2 ⋯ ∀ v n ¬  ( ϕ 1 ∧  ϕ 2 ⋯ ∧  ϕ m ) 
where  ϕ 1 ,  ϕ 2 , … ,  ϕ m are atomic formulae with variables from  v 1 , … ,  v n .
For a set Γ of axioms of , let  (Γ) be the theory consisting of the structures for 
which all axioms in Γ are true. If T =  (Γ) for some set Γ of axioms, we say that Γ 
is an axiomatization of T. If all axioms in Γ are UNCAF, we say that Γ is an UNCAF 
axiomatization of T.
For a theory T, denote by uncaf(T ) the set of UNCAF axioms that are true in all 
members of T. The following theorem is the main result of the article. It asserts that 
the empirical content of a theory has an axiomatization (whether or not the theory 
itself does), and that it can be axiomatized by the UNCAF axioms true for every 
structure in the theory.
THEOREM 1: For every theory T, ec(T ) is the theory axiomatized by the UNCAF 
axioms that are true in T : ec(T ) =   ( uncaf(T ) ) .
In the revealed preference example of Section I, ec( T u ) = ec( T wo ). The empiri-
cal content of these theories is the class of structures satisfying the strong axiom of 
revealed preference, which constitutes an UNCAF axiomatization of ec( T wo ) and of 
ec( T u ).
REMARK 1: The use of an inequality symbol is not standard in mathematical logic. 
Adding this symbol as a primitive, while not affecting the expressional power of the 
language, increases the set of UNCAF axioms. To see why, consider a language with 
a single unary predicate R representing the property of being red, and the theory 
that says that there exists exactly one red object. The empirical content of the theory 
is that there exists at most one red object. It is axiomatized by the UNCAF axiom
 ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ≠ y) ∧ R(x) ∧ R(y)).
We can write an equivalent axiom without using the inequality symbol
 ∀x ∀y ¬ (¬(x = y) ∧ R(x) ∧ R(y));
however, the latter axiom is not UNCAF.
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REMARK 2: In the working version of this article (Chambers, Echenique, and 
Shmaya 2011), we establish results for languages with function and constant sym-
bols, as well as an infinite list of relation symbols. We dismiss these concepts here in 
the interest of exposition.
A. Examples
We review examples of axioms taken from Kreps (1979); Gul and Pesendorfer 
(2001); and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009), as well as two classical axioms.
The following examples of axioms provide illustrations of Theorem 1. The 
first two are in the language   RP . The remaining examples are in the language  K = 〈∈, ∪, ∩, ⪰, ≻〉 (for   K we write ∪ and ∩ in the usual ways, even though 
they are relation symbols; see below).
 (i) ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ⪰ y) ∧ (y ≻ x))
 (ii) ∀x ∀y((x ⪰ y) ∨ (y ⪰ x))
 (iii) ∀x ∀y(x ≻ y → x ⪰ x ∪ y ⪰ y)
 (iv) ∀x ∃y((y ∈ x) ∧ (y ⪰ x))
 (v) ∀x ∀y ∀z(x ∼ x ∪ y → x ∪ z ∼ x ∪ y ∪ z).
Axiom (i) is UNCAF; it is a version of the weak axiom of revealed preference.
Axiom (ii) is the completeness axiom discussed in Section I; it is not UNCAF 
since it uses the disjunction symbol  ∨ .
Axiom (iii) is the Set Betweenness axiom from Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). 
Strictly speaking, this axiom should read ∀x ∀y ∀z((x ≻ y) ∧ ( ∪ (z, x, y)) → 
x ⪰ z ⪰ y), where the relation ∪ of arity 3 is meant to say that z is the union of x 
and y. The reason is that, in our language,  ∪  is a relation symbol, not a function 
symbol. Under the assumption of completeness, Set Betweenness is equivalent to 
the pair of UNCAF axioms:
 ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ⪰ y) ∧ (x ∪ y ≻ x))
 ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ⪰ y) ∧ (y ≻ x ∪ y)).
(In every structure  such that  ⪰  is complete and  ≻  is its strict part, axiom (iii) 
is true if and only if its equivalent UNCAF form is true. We often need to use such 
“relative’’ notions, and we explain how they work in Section IIIB.) We develop the 
implications for Gul and Pesendorfer’s theory in Section IVA below.
Axiom (iv) is Axiom (3) in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009). It is not 
UNCAF because it requires an existential quantifier. Hence, the theory described by 
this axiom makes nonfalsifiable claims.
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Axiom (v) is the main axiom in Kreps (1979), where we have used the notation ∼ 
to express the two directions of weak preference in the usual way. Similarly to (iii), 
Axiom (v) is equivalent to an UNCAF axiom under completeness.
B. Relative Theories
Often a researcher wants to take certain assumptions as given and find the empiri-
cal content of his theory relative to such given assumptions. For example, decision 
theorists often regard axioms such as continuity or completeness as “technical’’; 
they want to build on such axioms by studying other, more substantive, axioms.
Consider two theories, T and  T ′ , where T ⊂  T ′ . We can define the empirical con-
tent of T relative to  T ′ , written e c  T ′  (T ), as the class of all structures  ∈  T ′ that do 
not rationalize any data set that falsifies T, i.e.,
(2)  e c  T ′  (T ) = ec(T ) ∩  T ′ .
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
COROLLARY 1: For any theories T and  T ′ such that T ⊆  T ′ , e c  T ′  (T ) =  (uncaf(T )) ∩  T ′ .
We say that a collection of UNCAF axioms Λ is a UNCAF axiomatization of T 
relative to  T ′ if T =  (Λ) ∩  T ′ . Then Corollary 1 implies that the empirical content 
of T relative to  T ′ admits an UNCAF axiomatization relative to  T ′ .
C. Observing Absence of Relations
The previous discussion has emphasized the role of partial observability: the phe-
nomenon that data affirm the existence of certain relations but cannot certify the 
nonexistence of the relations one does not observe. We shall now expand on this 
issue by introducing the possibility that absence of relations may be observed.
To do so, we add, for every relation symbol R, a relation  ˜ R that represents absence 
of R.
Say that a language  supports negation of relations if its relation symbols 
are divided into pairs (R,  ˜ R ) with the same arity. The idea is that  ˜ R should rep-
resent the relation “R does not hold.” If  supports negation of relations, we 
denote by ON (observed negation) the theory of all structures  of  such 
that  ˜ R  is the complement of  R   for every relation symbol R of ; so that for any 
 x 1 , … ,  x n ,  ˜ R   ( x 1 , … ,  x n ) if and only if it is not the case that  R   ( x 1 , … ,  x n ). Say 
that T respects negation of relations if T ⊆ ON.
We denote by universal(T ) the set of universal axioms that are true in every struc-
ture of T. Universal axioms are more general than UNCAF axioms. They are axioms 
in which all the quantifiers over all the variables are “for all’’; they have no existen-
tial quantifiers. The completeness axiom ∀x ∀y((x ⪰ y) ∨ (y ⪰ x)) is an example of 
a universal axiom that is not UNCAF.
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The following corollary of Theorem 1 is proved in the Appendix. It is based on 
the fact that, for theories that respect negation of relations, every universal axiom is 
equivalent to an UNCAF axiom.
COROLLARY 2: Let  be a language that supports negation of relations and let 
T be a theory that respects negation of relations. Then e c ON (T ) =  (universal(T )).
Corollary 2 illustrates the relation between our results and the discussion in Popper 
(1959). Popper advocated universal theories. The distinction between UNCAF and 
universal axiomatizations is rooted in partial observability.
IV. Applications
We develop two simple applications of our framework to recent theories in behav-
ioral economics and decision theory. In each case, we show that the theories in ques-
tion have UNCAF axiomatizations. This result is important because it implies that 
the theories make only falsifiable claims.
The first application is to the theory of temptation and self-control, a model in 
decision theory dealing with the choice of menus of alternatives. Our second appli-
cation (Section IVB) is to models of multiple selves, which are used frequently in 
behavioral economics. No axiomatization is known for this application, but we can 
still show that the theory has an UNCAF axiomatization, and therefore that all the 
claims made by the theory are testable.
A. Temptation and Self-Control (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001)
Consider the language   K = 〈∈, ∪, ∩, ⪰, ≻〉, which we used in Section IIIA. 
We consider the theory of Gul and Pesendorfer’s set-betweenness axiom, relative to 
a basic theory that we take as given, using the framework of relative theories from 
Section IIIB.
Let  T ′ be the theory of all the structures (X, ∈ X , ∪ X , ∩ X ,  ⪰ X , ≻ X ) in which:
•	 X =  2 A for some set A ;
•  ∪ X and  ∩ X represent union and intersection of subsets of A ;
•	 	⪰ X is a complete binary relation on  2 A , and  ≻ X is its strict part;
and all structures that are isomorphic to a structure as just described. Thus  T ′  collects 
basic properties of the primitives of the model, and it would not be very interesting 
to test for these primitives.
Let  T GP be the set of all structures in  T ′ that satisfy Gul and Pesendorfer’s Set 
Betweenness axiom, equivalent (under completeness) to
 ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ⪰ y) ∧ (x ∪ y ≻ x))
and
 ∀x ∀y ¬ ((x ⪰ y) ∧ (y ≻ x ∪ y))
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written as two axioms. Each of these axiom(s) is UNCAF, so that according to (2) 
and Theorem 1, e c  T ′  ( T GP ) =  T GP .
B. Multiple Selves Preferences
We apply our concepts to a popular model without a known axiomatization, the 
model of multiple selves. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that the 
concepts we introduce are useful for studying theories that have no known axi-
omatizations (and whose empirical content is therefore not completely understood). 
Models of multiple selves are motivated by empirical observations (see, e.g., 
Ambrus and Rozen forthcoming; Green and Hojman 2008; Manzini and Mariotti 
2007; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; or Fundenberg and Levine 2006), but often 
they lack an axiomatization in terms of observables. Here we exhibit a broad class 
of such models that make only falsifiable claims.
In our framework, given is a fixed and finite set of agents, the “selves.’’ Given is 
also a rule for aggregating agents’ preferences into a single preference. The inter-
pretation is that an individual has conflicting preferences and reconciles these pref-
erences with a preference aggregation rule. Suppose an aggregate preference (a 
revealed preference) is observed. We ask whether it could have been generated by 
the rule for some profile of agents’ preferences.
Let n, the number of agents, be fixed. A preference aggregation rule maps every 
set X of alternatives and every preference profile ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) of linear orders2 over 
X to a complete binary relation over X. We write  ⪰ f ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) for the binary relation 
that results (suppressing notation for dependence on X ). We assume the following 
property:
DEFINITION 5 (Neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives): For all 
sets X and Y, for all x, y ∈ X and all w, z ∈ Y and all preference profiles ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) 
over X and (R ′  1 , … , R ′  n ) over Y, if for all i ∈ N, x  R i  y ⇔ w R ′  i  z, then 
x  ⪰ f ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) y ⇔ w  ⪰ f ( R′ 1 , … ,  R′  n ) z.
Fix a preference aggregation rule f. Consider the language with two binary rela-
tion symbols ⪰ and  ˜  ⪰ . A structure  is f-rationalizable if  ⪰ M =  ⪰ f ( R′ 1 , … ,  R′  n ) for 
some profile of linear orders ( R 1 , … ,  R n ) and  ˜  ⪰ M is the complement of  ⪰  . The 
class of f-rationalizable structures is denoted  T f . Note that  T f is in fact a theory, as it 
is closed under isomorphism (this is the content of neutrality).
PROPOSITION 1: For every f, e c ON ( T f ) =  T f .
Proposition 1 follows from Corollary 2 and results in Chambers, Echenique, and 
Shmaya (2012) that imply that  T f admits a universal axiomatization. We omit the 
details.
2 A linear order is complete, transitive, and antisymmetric.
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V. Related Literature
We are not the first to investigate empirical content; results exist in the literatures 
of philosophy of science and mathematical psychology. Popper (1959) is a seminal 
reference, viewing falsifiable theories as those that admit universal axiomatizations 
(see Section IIIC on how universal and UNCAF axiomatizations differ).
Much early literature in philosophy of science was concerned with whether the 
restrictions on observable relations imposed by axioms involving unobservable rela-
tions could be expressed in terms of observable relations alone. Craig (1956) pro-
vides a seminal result in this direction.
Adams, Fagot, and Robinson (1970) seem to be the first social scientists to dis-
cuss empirical content in a formal sense (see also Pfanzagl 1966 and Adams 1992). 
This work defines two theories to be empirically equivalent if the set of all axioms 
(of a certain type) consistent with one theory is equivalent to the set of all axioms 
consistent with the other. These works do not provide a general characterization of 
the axiomatic structure of empirical content but rather focus on characterizing the 
empirical content of specific theories.
Simon and Groen (1973) present a formal study of the testable implications of 
scientific theories (see also Simon 1979, 1983, 1985; and Rynasiewicz 1983; and 
Shen and Simon 1993). Their notion of data does not allow for partial observability.
Finally, some of our formal arguments are close to results by Tarski (1954). Tarski 
characterizes those theories that have a universal axiomatization. As we demon-
strated in Section IIIC, the issue of universal axiomatization is related to falsifica-
tion, but Tarski never explored this aspect of his result. We discuss Tarski’s Theorem 
and its relation to our theorem in Appendix B.
The discussion in Brown and Kubler (2008) also provides a general framework 
for falsification in economic theories. The focus is on mathematical environments 
that admit quantifier elimination, and on economic theories that can be expressed 
using these environments.
VI. Discussion
We develop a theory of empirical content. Many studies in decision and choice 
theory aim to provide testable axioms characterizing individual behavior. We inves-
tigate when such axioms are indeed testable and argue that our analysis is useful 
for understanding and advancing modern decision and choice theory. Our leading 
examples are borrowed from revealed preference theory and should be familiar to 
most economists, but we have also shown that the results are applicable to less well-
understood theories and can give new substantive results.
There is a recurring methodological debate in economics over the importance 
of the falsifiability of a theory. Early literature was sparked by Milton Friedman’s 
(1953) position that the truth of assumptions does not matter. In our terminology, 
a non-UNCAF axiomatization may be preferable to an UNCAF axiomatization 
because it is a more tractable description of the theory. (We thank an anonymous 
referee for phrasing the issue in this way.) We agree that this may be the case, but to 
verify that the two descriptions are observationally equivalent, we must understand 
their empirical content in the first place. This is why our results are useful. The 
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two  axioms of decision theory that seem to have generated the greatest amount of 
research are the independence axiom and the sure thing principle, each of which has 
been experimentally falsified, and each of which can be specified in UNCAF form.
Paul Samuelson (see Archibald, Simon, and Samuelson 1963) counters Friedman’s 
position with ideas that we have formalized. Samuelson claims that assumptions 
matter because either a theory T (described by its “assumptions’’) makes only 
falsifiable claims and is, thus, equivalent to its empirical content, in which case 
Friedman’s point is moot; or it makes nonfalsifiable claims, in which case the failure 
to refute the theory is uninformative about the theory’s nonfalsifiable claims. In fact, 
Samuelson argues by Occam’s Razor, one should choose the weaker theory, consist-
ing of the empirical content of T (what we have formally termed ec(T )), rather than 
unnecessary claims in T. Regardless of one’s position on the question of realism, 
this example shows how our notions may be useful.
Finally, we have studied basic ideas from philosophical positivism. As scientists 
may have agendas other than falsification, philosophy of science since Popper has 
focused on the sociology of actual research. It seems that most economists still find 
the problem of falsification important. In fact, recent methodological discussions 
in Gul and Pesendorfer (2008); Dekel and Lipman (2010); and Gilboa (2009) all 
take for granted that one wants to understand a theory’s empirical content (pos-
sible exceptions are Hickes 1983 and Rubinstein 2006). In addition, Olszewski and 
Sandroni (2011) study a falsifiability problem for nondeterministic theories. We 
believe that a formal understanding of empirical content is useful, independent of 
the complexities involved in the actual production of research.
Appendix A: Proofs
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let  be a language and  a -data set. For every d ∈ D let  v d be a variable. Let ϕ  be the following UNCAF formula of  :
(A1)  ϕ  =  ∀ d  v d ¬  _ ϕ , where
   _ ϕ =  ∧   
 
 ( v d ≠  v  d ′  )   ∧   
 
R( v  d 1  , … ,  v  d n  ),
where  ∀ d v d stands for concatenation of universal quantifiers over all the variables 
v d for d ∈ D. In the definition of  _ ϕ , the first conjunction ranges over all pairs 
d ≠  d′ ∈ D, and the second conjunction ranges over all relation symbols R and 
every ( d 1 , … ,  d n ) ∈  R  .
LEMMA 1: Let  be a finite data set. Then  ϕ  is not true in  if and only if  is 
rationalized by some isomorphic copy of .
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
If a structure  rationalizes  then substituting d for  v d we get that  _ ϕ is true 
in  under this substitution, and therefore  ϕ  is not true in . Since truth is 
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 preserved under isomorphisms, it follows that if an isomorphic copy of  rational-
izes  then  ϕ  is not true in .
Assume now that  is an -structure such that  ϕ  is not true in , and assume 
without loss of generality that the domains M and D of  and  are disjoint 
(otherwise replace  with an isomorphic structure and use the fact that truth is 
preserved under isomorphism). Since  ϕ  is not true in  there exist elements 
 
_ m = ( m d ) d∈D of M such that  _ ϕ is true in  under the substitution s given by 
s( v d ) =  m d . Consider the isomorphic structure of  ′ which is obtained by 
replacing every element  m d with d. (Note that this replacement is possible since 
 m d ≠  m d ′ whenever d ≠  d′ , which follows from the fact that  _ ϕ is true in  under 
s.) Then  _ ϕ is true in ′ under substitution  s′ given by  s′ ( v d ) = d. It follows that ( d 1 , … ,  d n ) ∈  R   ′  for every relation symbol R and every ( d 1 , … ,  d n ) ∈  R  . 
Thus,  R  ⊆  R    ′  for every relation symbol R, and so property (2) in Definition 1 is 
satisfied. Therefore ′ is an isomorphic copy of  that rationalizes .
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
We divide the proof into two steps:
Step 1: If  ∈  (uncaf(T )) then  ∈ ec(T ).
Let  be a data set that falsifies T. Then from Lemma 1, and the fact that T is 
closed under isomorphism, it follows that  ϕ  is true in all structures of T, so that ϕ  ∈ uncaf(T ). Therefore  ϕ  is true in , as by hypothesis  ∈  (uncaf(T )). By 
Lemma 1 again it follows that  does not rationalize .
Thus, we proved that  does not rationalize any data set that falsifies T. By 
Definition 3, it follows that  ∈ ec(T ) as desired.
Step 2: If  ∉  (uncaf(T )) then  ∉ ec(T ).
Let ϕ ∈   ( uncaf(T ) ) be not true in . Let V be the finite set of variables of ϕ 
so that ϕ =  ∀ v∈V v ¬  _ ϕ where  _ ϕ is a conjunction of atomic formulae with variables 
in V and  ∀ v∈V v stands for a concatenation of universal quantifiers over all variables 
v ∈ V.
Since ϕ is not true in , it follows that there exists some assignment s : V → M 
of elements in the universe of  to variables such that  _ ϕ becomes true in  under 
the substitution s(v) for every variable v of  _ ϕ.
Let  be a finite data set defined as follows: the domain D of  is given by 
D = s(V ).
For every relation symbol R,
  R  = { ( s( v 1 ), … , s( v k ) ) | R ( v 1 , … ,  v k )  appears in  _ ϕ}.
Then  is a data set that is rationalized by , and ϕ is not true in any structure 
that rationalizes . But ϕ is true in every structure of T, and therefore  falsifies T. 
Thus, we proved that  contains a data set  that falsifies T. Therefore  ∉ ec(T ) 
by Definition 3.
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B. Proof of Corollary 2
The corollary follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the following Lemma.
LEMMA 2: Let  be a language that supports negation of relations. Then for 
every universal axiom ϕ in  there exist UNCAF axioms  ϕ 1 , … ,  ϕ n such that ϕ ↔  ϕ 1 ∧ ⋯ ∧  ϕ n is true for ON.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
We provide a purely syntactic proof. Consider the universal axiom ∀  _ v  _ ϕ( _ v), 
where ϕ is quantifier free and  _ v are the variables that appear in ϕ. Writing  _ ϕ in its 
conjunctive normal form,3 we get that ϕ is equivalent to a formula of the form
 ∀  _ v  ∧ 
i=1




 ϕ i, j ,
where each ϕ i, j is a literal, i.e., an atomic formula or a negation of an atomic for-
mula. Changing the order of the conjunction and the universal quantifier we obtain 
a formula of the form
  ∧ 
i=1
 m ∀  _ v  ∨ 
j=1
 n ϕ i, j .
Using De Morgan’s law and replacing each ϕ i, j with its negation we get a formula 
of the form
(A2)  ∧ 
i=1
 m ∀  _ v ¬  ∧ 
j=1
 n ϕ i, j .
Finally, under ON every literal is equivalent to an atomic formula since 
¬R( v 1 , … ,  v k ) is equivalent to  ˜ R ( v 1 , … ,  v k ) for every variable  v 1 , … ,  v k . Therefore we 
can change the formulae ϕ i, j in (A2) to atomic formulae and arrive at a conjunction 
of UNCAFs, as desired.
Appendix B: Comparison with Tarski’s Theorem
As discussed in Section V, Karl Popper regarded universality, rather than UNCAF, 
as the defining characteristic of falsifiability. Popper’s theory “all swans are white’’ 
is not an UNCAF theory, yet Popper regarded it as falsifiable. Tarski’s Theorem 
characterizes those theories that admit a universal axiomatization. The aim of this 
section is to explain how our theorem relates to Tarski’s Theorem.
We first reformulate Tarski’s Theorem to highlight the relationship with our 
theorem. Let  be a language without constant symbols. Recall that, given two 
-structures  and  with universes M and N, we say  is a substructure of  
3 The conjunctive normal form of a quantifier free formula is a logically equivalent formula in which all conjunc-
tions and disjunctions occur at the beginning of the formula, the conjunction coming first.
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if N ⊆ M, and for all x, … ,  x n ∈ N and all relations R, R( x 1 , … ,  x n ) holds in N if 
and only if it holds in .
Finally, we say that an axiom is universal if it has the form 
∀ v 1 … ∀ v n ϕ( v 1 , … ,  v n ), where ϕ is quantifier free, and a theory admits a universal 
axiomatization if there is a collection of universal axioms Λ such that T =   (Λ).
Tarski (1954) proved the following theorem:
THEOREM 2: Let  be a language without constant symbols and let T be an 
-theory. Then T admits a universal axiomatization if and only if the following con-
dition holds: Every structure  that is not in T contains a finite substructure  such 
that  is not substructure of any member of T.
We note that the condition in Tarski’s Theorem is very similar to the condition 
that Simon and Groen (1973) call finitely and irrevocably testable.4 The similarity 
between Tarski’s Theorem and our theorem is now transparent: we replace Tarksi’s 
finite substructure with data sets and get an UNCAF axiomatization instead of a 
universal axiomatization.
Falsifiability was not Tarski’s motivation. Indeed, substructures are unsatisfac-
tory as mathematical models for observed data since they correspond to a situation 
in which the scientist observes the presence or absence of every possible relation 
among the elements in his data and, therefore, cannot accommodate partial observ-
ability. In contrast, our definition of data set assumes that, when a relation is present, 
the scientist can potentially observe it but will not necessarily observe it.
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